¿Qué son las instituciones?

Geoffrey Martin Hodgson

doi:10.18046/recs.i8.1128

Autores

Geoffrey Martin Hodgson University of Hertfordshire

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18046/recs.i8.1128

Palavras-chave:

Instituições, Organizações, Regras formais, Regras informais, Hábito

Resumo

Embora o conceito de instituição tenha uma longa história nas ciências sociais, ainda não existe consenso sobre sua definição. O autor mostra as ambigüidades das colocações de North quando restringe o conceito aos sistemas de regras formais que regem as organizações. Para ultrapassar essas dificuldades, propõe uma visão mais abrangente que leva em conta a informalidade que está na base de todo comportamento estruturado e duradouro.

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